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Flat Physicalism: Some Implications
1. Flat Physicalism 
Consider a token event according to a consistent disjunction of some theories 
of fundamental physics.1 For example, think of a particular event in which 
the fundamental physical structure of the entire universe is such that certain 
particles (in the sense of these theories) exist and interact (in the sense of 
these theories) in a particular way.2 By the name “flat physicalism” I call 
the idea that where this token obtains, it is everything that there is.3 In this 
section I provide a quick introduction of the idea, and in the next sections I 
describe some of its implications.
Suppose that the event just mentioned is one in which, using more 
mundane vocabulary, a particular piece of cork floats in a particular glass of 
1
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1 Since major theories of contemporary physics are inconsistent with each other (e.g., 
quantum mechanics and the general theory of relativity, in certain circumstances), and 
since some of their predictions seem to be empirically inadequate (for example, with 
astronomical observations), and since there also seems to be some incompleteness 
(since there is no accepted solution for the measurement problem in quantum 
mechanics), it is hard to say what fundamental physics is and what is the world 
picture it presents. A major project in contemporary physics and philosophy is to 
solve these problems. For instance, to solve the above consistency problem physicists 
work on developing theories that (when completed will) go by the names of quantum 
gravity and string theory. Part of this problem is often described in terms of Hempel’s 
Dilemma, which I do not address here. For a description of this problem and some 
attempts to solve it, see Ney (2008).
2 The terms “particles” and “interactions” in contemporary physics are not the intuitive 
ones, and it is of course not guaranteed that any of these concepts will survive in future 
physics. Everything I say below is compatible with this caveat in mind.
3 For an overview of various meanings attached to the term “physicalism” in 
contemporary literature, consult Stoljar (2016).
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water. In flat physicalism, introducing this vocabulary adds nothing to the 
intended ontology. The meaning and significance of this last statement will 
become clear as we proceed.
Now focus your attention on an aspect of this particular token, given by 
some partial description of it. This aspect exists as part of the particular 
token (together, of course, with its other aspects).4 In general, there may be 
other (counterfactual) tokens that share this aspect. The set of tokens that 
share this aspect, namely, all the tokens that form an equivalence set relative 
to it, forms a type. When we say that a certain token belongs to a certain type, 
all we do is provide a partial description of that token, pertaining to one of 
its aspects; we refer to the aspect of the particular token, and not to the set 
of counterfactual tokens that share this aspect. However there is, of course, 
theoretical advantage in talking about such sets of counterfactual tokens, 
since it enables us to discuss regularities and deduce predictions from them.5 
For example, the term “floating cork” is the name of an aspect of the 
token alluded to above; this aspect is given by a partial description of that 
token. There are many counterfactual tokens that share this aspect: some 
of them may obtain at other moments, and some may never obtain. These 
counterfactual tokens differ in the details of the field excitations described 
by quantum field theory, but are identical to each other with respect to certain 
aspects of those field excitations (given by partial descriptions of these field 
excitations) and – according to flat physicalism, as I propose it here – the 
name of these shared aspects is “floating cork.” Since in flat physicalism, 
when a token obtains, it is everything that there is, this is the only sort of 
types that can be. 
4 Portides (2017) uses a similar idea when he argues that a key element in the 
construction of scientific models is the extraction of relevant features of the 
system or process to be modeled, or selective attention to its features, rather than 
the substraction or change of features (as abstraction and idealization, respectively, 
are often understood). For more on “aspects” as given by partial descriptions in the 
special sciences, see Hemmo and Shenker (2015).
5 Ben Menahem (2001) argues that when focusing on different aspects of the same 
system, different regularities may appear; see discussion in Shenker (2014). This 
is indeed the case in statistical mechanics, where the focus on partial features of 
the mechanical microstate of a system (sometimes called “macrovariables” in that 
context) reveals the thermodynamic regularities, including the time asymmetric 
approach to equilibrium; see Hemmo and Shenker (2012, 2016), Shenker (2017a, 
2017b). 
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According to flat physicalism, when an observer (like us) interacts 
with an observed system that has this aspect, the observer’s sense organs, 
due to their physical making, interact with that aspect (and not with other 
aspects of that token), creating a physical signal that is transferred to (say) 
the observer’s brain, which then comes to have its own physical state, in 
which the observer has a mental state called “experiencing a floating cork.” 
(More details below.) To the extent that there can be a physicalist account 
of intentionality (I think there can be, but I do not address this here), the 
reference of statements like “here is a floating cork” is the particular aspect 
of the particular token that obtains (or of a sequence of tokens that share 
this aspect during the observation) and with which the observer interacts. 
In this sense, in flat physicalism, a case of “floating cork” is a case of a 
particular aspect of a particular token (in the literature sometimes the phrase 
“is identical with” is preferred to “is,” but I prefer the latter for reasons that 
I shall not discuss here).
2. A Flat-Physicalist Account of the Special Sciences
As I said above, according to flat physicalism using the terminology “floating 
cork” adds nothing to the ontology: it only denotes an aspect of a token that 
is given by its partial description, and that can be shared by other tokens. 
Here is the general account, in this picture, of the types that appear in the 
special sciences.6 Consider three tokens in the above sense, call them A, B, 
and C, such that A and B are both instances of the kind P in some special 
science, but C isn’t. In flat physicalism this means that tokens A and B share 
a physical aspect, and this aspect is (identical with) the special science kind 
P; and C does not have this aspect. Let me emphasize: the physical aspect 
that A and B share does not merely give rise to the special science kind P: 
rather, it just is the special science kind P.
When I am saying that this is the flat-physicalist account of special 
sciences kinds I am not saying that we know which are the (shared) physical 
aspects that are identical with those kinds. Of course, we do not know that: 
the world is complex and science is young. But, what I’m saying is that the 
kinds couldn’t be anything else, because there isn’t anything else. There are 
6 For a detailed analysis of some cases of special sciences types that are interesting 
and relevant for our context, see Polger and Shapiro (2016).
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only tokens, and aspect of tokens given by their partial description. This is 
what I mean by flat physicalism about the special sciences.
Notice that in flat physicalism there are no levels of reality, not even level 
structures defined locally relative to a given mechanism: instead of high 
level and low level, what we have are different aspects, given by different 
descriptions, of the state of the universe; that is, they are all at the same 
level. Perhaps some of these descriptions are more coarse-grained and others 
are more fine grained descriptions of it (up to the precise full description 
of the token), but there needn’t be a full ordering relation between the sets 
of tokens that make up the kinds. And if there is only one level of reality 
and of description, there is no room, and no need, for discussing inter-level 
relations.7 Notions such as realization, grounding, constitution, and the like, 
ought (in this picture) to be understood as convenient ways of talking about 
either synchronous relations between different aspects of the single token (at 
each moment), or diachronous relations between aspects of different tokens 
(at different moments), such as causal relations (employing some appropriate 
concept of causation).
In flat physicalism a kind that is discussed by a special science (P in the 
above discussion) is nothing but an aspect of the physical fundamental state 
of the universe (an aspect of the microstates A and B above). Therefore, once 
the right physical aspect is identified, there is nothing more to say or explain 
concerning the special science kind: the very identification of the physical 
aspect of the state of the universe, which just is the special science kind, 
is its full explanation. What remains to be described is the structural and 
causal relations between the kinds, that is, between the various aspects of the 
token; and those are fully described by the fundamental theories of physics. 
Papineau (1993, 180–181) makes a similar point:
Consider this parable. Suppose that there are two groups of historians, one 
of which studies the famous American writer Mark Twain, while the other 
studies his less well-known contemporary, Samuel Clemens. The two groups 
have heard of each other, but their paths have tended not to cross. Then 
one year they both hold symposia at the American Historical Association, 
and late one night in the bar of the Chicago Sheraton the penny drops, and 
they realize they have both been studying the same person. At this stage 
7 See Shenker (2017b) on the argument of Bechtel (2017), who offers a critical 
discussion of causation in the levels picture that forms part of mechanistic explanations.
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there are plenty of questions they might ask. Why did this person go under 
two names? Why did it take us so long to realize Mark Twain and Samuel 
Clemens were the same person? But it doesn’t make sense for them to ask: 
why were Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens the same person? If they were, 
they were, and there’s an end on it.8
Returning to the floating cork example, in this picture the cork is nothing 
but an assembly of particles that interact in a certain way as described by 
physics, and so are the water and the glass: they are nothing but aspects of 
the state of the world as described by the fundamental theories of physics. 
Both their constituents and the relations between those constituents are fully 
described by the physical theories, and no room is left for some further 
“metaphysical” elements (as for example in versions of “grounding” or 
“realization”).9 “Floating” is a certain kind of physical interaction between 
certain kinds of physical particles. Nothing more. In this sense one might 
aptly say that “atoms float.”10
Here is an example of how this identity theory is applied in contemporary 
physics. According to each and every physical theory (such as classical 
mechanics or non-relativistic quantum mechanics) the world at any given 
time11 is in a well-defined state that is describable in terms of that theory, 
and the theory takes it to be the complete and exhaustive state of the world. 
The instantaneous complete state according to a given theory is called a 
‘microscopic state’ or ‘microstate’. (In other contexts the term ‘microscopic’ 
sometimes means small, or part of a whole, but in physics the term 
‘microstate’ denotes the complete state of the system.) 
Prima facie, describing the universe in terms of its physical microstate 
seems not to capture properties that have central roles in biology or in 
psychology. Something seems to be missing here. However, if the physical 
microstate is complete, and if everything (according to flat physicalism) is 
physical, the only way to be informative and non-repetitive, is to say less, not 
more (in the slogan “less, not more” flat physicalism radically differs from 
non-reductive approaches like realization and grounding, all of which add 
8 I am grateful to Professor David Papineau for a stimulating discussion of this point.
9 See Chang (2012, 2017). 
10 The challenge of this intriguing phrase was presented by Ken Aizawa in a discussion. 
11 The phrase “given time” calls for relativistic refinement, which I do not undertake 
here.
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something to the complete microstate, as I show below.) Instead of describing 
the full physical microstate we have to focus on a partial description of it, of 
an aspect of it. The notion of so-called high level properties is explained as 
being merely a partial description: not an additional high level fact (“more”), 
but a partial description (“less”). 
Identity statements such as “heat is the motion of molecules” (Kripke 
1980), which appear for example in the special science of thermodynamics,12 
are explained along these lines. The complete classical mechanical 
microstate of a system is the complete list of all the positions and velocities 
of its particles, but the temperature of an ideal gas in equilibrium is identified 
with the average kinetic energy of the particles of the gas, which is an aspect 
of the complete microstate, given by a very partial description of it.13 In 
the jargon of physics, an aspect of the microstate is called a macrovariable. 
So the macrovariable of partial kinetic energy is temperature (in an ideal 
gas in equilibrium): it is not merely associated with temperature, it doesn’t 
give rise to temperature, it doesn’t ground temperature, and it doesn’t realize 
temperature: it just is temperature. If A, B, and C are events (pertaining, 
say, to a sample of an ideal gas in equilibrium) such that A and B share the 
same temperature but C doesn’t, then in cases A and B the microstates of the 
system of interest have the same average kinetic energy, and in case C the 
microstate does not have it.14
3. Multiple Realization in the Special Sciences (Except Psychology)
The case of temperature in an ideal gas in equilibrium illustrates one sort 
of special sciences kinds according to flat physicalism. Special sciences 
kinds of that sort are reducible to physical kinds, where physical kinds are 
12 Although thermodynamics is considered a theory of physics, it is not a fundamental 
theory, and has the status of a special science. It is a non-trivial achievement that 
(unlike other special sciences like biology), the physical aspects (macrovariables) 
that are the thermodynamic properties have been identified and their regularities 
described, in statistical mechanics (see Shenker 2017a, b).
13 On the way in which thermodynamic quantities are associated with mechanical 
ones, see Shenker (2017a).
14 All the mechanical magnitudes properly associated with “temperature,” in all 
materials and conditions, share a macrovariable, either in the way described so far or 
in the way described below. I do not go into the details here.
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understood in terms of aspects (or macrovariables) as explained above. 
But there is another sort of special sciences kinds that we need to look 
into. Special sciences kinds of this sort are sometimes seen as irreducible 
to physical kinds. If the world is taken to be fundamentally physical, then 
special sciences kinds of this latter sort are (on this view) seen as “multiply 
realized” by physical kinds. In this section I examine what this notion of 
multiple realization can mean, and how the impression that it obtains in 
some cases can arise, within a flat physicalist approach. 
Suppose that A, B, and C are token states: for example, they can be three 
possible microstates of some system S, such that (as before) A and B are 
cases of the special science kind P but C isn’t.15 But this time (unlike the 
case discussed in the previous section) suppose that tokens A and B do not 
share any relevant physical aspect, despite being two instances of the special 
science kind P: we shall say that A and B are physically heterogeneous 
relative to P. 
Two remarks concerning the above characterization are important. First: 
By insisting that A and B are heterogeneous – that is, that they do not share 
any relevant physical aspect – I mean that in order to account for the fact that 
A and B are P but C isn’t one cannot appeal to some “similarity” between A 
and B (but not C), since “similarity” means that there are aspects, possibly 
coarse grained properties, in which A and B are identical, and this takes 
us back to the case discussed in the previous section. The result is that C – 
which is not a case of P – is as physically different from A and B relative to 
P, as A and B are from each other relative to P. 
Second: Perhaps mathematically any two token microstates share some 
aspect. In this case we shall suppose that none of these aspects, shared by 
A and B, is the property P. Unless we make this assumption all the special 
sciences kinds are reducible to physical kinds in the way presented in the 
previous section, and there are no cases of multiple realization. This may 
well be the case, but since I want to discuss possible meanings of the notion 
of multiple realization I do not want to start with this conclusion.
There is only one physical account of the case where A and B appear to 
share a property P despite being physically heterogeneous, and it is this. In 
addition to the system S, of which A and B are microstates, there is another 
15 A, B, and C can also be the microstates of several systems S1, S2, etc., but hereafter I 
ignore this case, for simplicity. It is easy to generalize the argument below for this case.
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system, call it M, such that when S is (or starts out) in states A or B, M 
is (or ends up) in states K or L, and the states K or L share the physical 
aspect P. There are different versions of this case: It may be that S interacts 
with M in such a way that if S starts out in states A or B then, following 
these interactions, system M reaches microstates K or L (respectively) that 
share the physical aspect P. Alternatively, some common cause may be in 
action. All these options are acceptable, as long as they are describable in 
physical terminology. (In particular I do not want to be committed to any 
notion of causation or law.) On this picture one might say that A and B share 
the physical fact that when S is (or starts out) in microstates A or B, M is (or 
ends up) in a microstate with aspect P. This fact is not a physical aspect of 
the microstates A and B in and of themselves, but is a physical aspect of the 
entire relevant physical scenario that includes S, M, their microstates (A and 
B of S and K and L of M) and their interactions. (Therefore P may be seen as 
a “contextual property.”)16 And so this case is reducible to physics: there is 
an account of what is going on here in physical terms. 
To say that this is a case of “multiple realization of the kind P by physical 
kinds” is to interpret the fact that the microstates K and L of system M share 
the aspect P, as indicating that the (physically heterogeneous) microstates A 
and B of system S share a property, also called P (let’s call it for a second 
P’, to avoid confusion). Importantly, this property P’ (of A and B) is not the 
abovementioned “causal power” (or something like that) to bring it about 
that M will have property P. Were the property P’ (shared by A and B) such 
a “causal power,” the conclusion would be that A and B share a physical 
property, and therefore are not physically heterogeneous after all; but if P’ 
would be a physical property shared by A and B, we would not have a case of 
multiple realization of a “non-physical” kind by a “physical” kind. 
Such an interpretation is tempting and natural, especially where the system 
M is us, (human) observers. For suppose that our brain M is in microstates K 
or L that share the aspect P, whenever (we know that) A or B (respectively) 
obtain. (I address multiple realization in psychology in the next section.) 
It is natural to jump to the conclusion that the explanation of this shared 
experience is a shared property of the “observed” states A and B. But natural 
as it may be, this interpretation is neither analytic, nor entailed by physics: 
16 In quantum mechanics contextuality may have a different meaning and different 
implications, depending on the interpretation.
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the case where it may obtain was addressed in the previous section, in which 
case A and B did share a physical aspect. Here, however, we address a case 
where it does not obtain, since A and B are heterogeneous. This natural (and 
in this case mistaken) interpretation leads to the further mistaken conclusion 
that, since A and B are physically heterogeneous, the property that they 
(seemingly!) share must be non-physical. It is here that the unfortunate talk 
about “brute facts” and mysterious “irreducible” properties enters the picture 
(e.g., Fodor 1974, 1997; Putnam 1967; I address Davidson 1970 in more 
detail below).
To opt for the non-reductive line of thinking is to choose the interpretation 
that whenever we (as M) have the same experience (of P) then A and B must 
also share a property (P’ above). And in this line of thinking one is committed 
to the conclusion that the (alleged) non-physical facts, that (supposedly) 
make tokens A and B cases of the same kind, must obtain in each and every 
token. When, for example, token A obtains (and token B does not obtain) 
we experience the particular token A (since this is everything that obtains in 
that case),17 and we experience it as having the property P, and we predict 
the evolution of that particular token on the basis of this particular fact. And 
so this is a case of token dualism. This dualism is not only about kinds, and 
is not only about sets, but is a fact about each and every individual token. 
Whether it is property dualism or substance dualism doesn’t matter here.
Tom Polger and Larry Shapiro, in their recent (2016) The Multiple 
Realization Book, argue that whether or not multiple realization holds in our 
world is a question of fact. I agree with them (though not with all the details 
of their argument). But if multiple realization holds in our world then dualism 
holds as well. And this if–then conclusion is not empirical, but analytical. 
Calling a position dualism is not pejorative. I use this term to denote every 
position according to which there are things beyond those postulated by 
physics. Dualism may be a coherent position, and in this sense it is a serious 
candidate for being true of the world (I do not endorse it, for reasons that I 
do not address here). By contrast, the idea of non-reductive physicalism is, 
as we saw, conceptually incoherent. It is, therefore, not a candidate for being 
true of the world. (It is therefore no wonder that closely examined cases 
turn out to be ones of identity, not of multiple realization; see examples in 
17 When A obtains (and B does not obtain) we ascribe the property P to A, not to {A 
or B}, especially if the sets in question are open, as Fodor (1997) emphasizes. 
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Polger and Shapiro 2016. Although I do not endorse their notion of multiple 
realization, their case analyses are useful.) 
Remark on functionalism: it is often said that the fact that makes A and B, 
for instance, cases of P despite their being physically heterogeneous is that 
they are, or are part of, a “function.” I will not address this line of thinking 
here, except making the following comment. If the “function” P that is 
common to A and B is physical, then it is a physical fact that is shared by A 
and B, and there is no multiple realization. If the “function” P is not physical, 
then this is a case of dualism, in the above (non-pejorative) sense. This holds 
also for the case addressed in the next section.
4. The Case of Psychology
An interesting consequence of the understanding gained so far is that 
the special science of psychology is very different from the other special 
sciences like biology. And the difference has nothing to do with the so-called 
hard problem or even with the so-called explanatory gap, since the unique 
nature of psychology appears even within the framework of flat physicalism, 
that is, even if we accept that each and every token is completely physical. 
And the difference is this. In both biology and psychology, if tokens A 
and B of system S belong to type P (but C doesn’t), this can be the result 
of their sharing an aspect P (that C doesn’t share with them). But while 
in special sciences like biology or thermodynamics, a type can also be the 
result of another system M having aspect P following its interaction with A 
or B (but not C), this route is not open for psychological types. Here is why. 
In psychology A and B are already tokens of the observer M. If they share 
the aspect P, then they are not multiply realized; but if they do not share it, 
then bringing in another device M’ that will measure them and end up having 
aspect P means bringing in another observer (an observer M’ of the observer 
M), which is the beginning of a possible regress. The regress can be stopped 
only by conceding that the very last observer in this chain arrives at two 
microstates (following its indirect interactions with A and B) that share the 
aspect P; so in principle we could make this concession already with the first 
observer, M. M’ (and the other observers of observers) can be seen as cases 
of the homunculus fallacy. Since the homunculus brings with it an infinite 
regress, it is unhelpful, and so we reject this option. And so there are only 
one physicalist account for the fact that tokens A and B are both of the same 
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psychological kind P: they must share the physical aspect P. Consequently, 
whereas there is a flat-physicalist account of apparent (though not genuine) 
multiple realization in biology, and other special sciences, this option is not 
available in psychology. There, appearance of multiple realization must, as a 
matter of principle, be an indication of a mistake or of an unfinished research 
or, alternatively, of implicit token dualism.
To emphasize this point suppose that we encounter another token D for 
the first time, and see that it is of the psychological kind P. For example, 
suppose that the world, including my brain, is in some physical token state 
in which my brain is in the token state D, and that I’m in pain (of a particular 
sort), which is the mental kind P. And suppose that D does not share any 
(relevant) physical aspect with tokens A and B that can be identified with 
this mental state: A, B, and D are heterogeneous with respect to P, so that D 
is as different (relative to P) from A and from B as it is from C (which is not 
P). In this sense the fact that makes D a case of P cannot be in the physics of 
D. Since P is a mental type, there is no external system – no homunculus – 
outside the physical tokens which unifies them under the type P. So in case 
D (in which, recall, I feel pain), the only thing that makes it the case that 
my mental state is of kind P is a “brute” non-physical fact. And so this is a 
case of token dualism. (This is the case whether, in order to be in the mental 
state P, I interact with this non-physical fact, or I am that non-physical fact.) 
Again, dualism is not a pejorative term, but one must be clear about one’s 
ontological commitments.
5. Anomaly of the Mental Is Compatible with Reductive Type-Physicalism
By way of summing up let me illustrate the strength and flexibility of 
flat physicalism. Davidson (1970) famously claimed that the mental is 
anomalous, and since the physical is subject to strict laws, he had to free 
the mental from the physical by giving up the requirement that the mental 
should supervene on the physical. Kim (1992) pointed out to Davidson that 
this is a problematic move, and Davidson (1993) made a slight concession 
by endorsing weak supervenience. I do not know if indeed the mental is 
anomalous. This is a question of fact. But what I want to show is that even if 
it is, Davidson didn’t have to give up supervenience. He could account for the 
anomaly of the mental within type identity physicalism, in the framework of 
flat physicalism. (Davidson was not a physicalist: he took himself, and many 
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take him, to be a monist. I think that his views concerning what “physical” 
and “mental” are, namely (roughly), alternative ways of descriptions of 
events, or of partitioning events into sets, are incompatible with monism, 
and Davidson is therefore an implicit substance dualist. I argue for this in 
Shenker (2014). But here I wish to show how the very idea of anomaly of the 
mental is compatible with flat physicalism, and so this is not intended to be 
made a part of Davidson’s general ontological framework.)
Accounting for the possibility of anomalous mental kinds in a type-
physicalist framework like flat physicalism requires some technicalities. I 
will not go into them, and just outline the idea, using some jargon of physics 
(for more details on this jargon consult Hemmo and Shenker 2016 and 
Shenker 2017a). Consider the figure presented below, which depicts three 
cases of the state space of a system (or of the universe), in which each point 
represents the system’s microstate. I begin with the feature common to the 
three cases, and then discuss the differences between them. 
In all the three cases, the system is prepared (or the universe starts out) 
in a microstate that belongs to the set of microstates at the bottom left, that 
is, in a microstate that has the aspect shared by all the microstates in that set 
(this is how we prepare systems for experiments, in the most general sense 
of the term). Due to the strict laws of physics,18 each microstate in that initial 
bottom left set evolves, after some time ∆t1, to a microstate in the next 
grey rectangle, and then after another interval ∆t2 to another microstate in 
the next set, and so forth, as illustrated with the arrows in the figure. (The 
sequence of grey rectangles in the figure are the Poincaré sections of the 
bundle of trajectories of the time evolution of that initial set of microstates, 
at several points of time.) In all three cases the dynamics is the same: every 
given microstate evolves in the same way, and therefore if all we know is 
that the microstate is a member of the bottom left set at the initial time, and 
follow all the counterfactual microstates in that set, then the evolution of the 
sets is identical in the three cases. 
Now the differences between the three cases. In each of the three cases the 
microstates in the state space are partitioned into sets in a different way. In 
each set, in each of the three cases, the microstates share an aspect, and each 
of the three cases corresponds to different aspects of the microstates. In each 
such set the microstates form an equivalence set relative to a given aspect, 
18 The case of probabilistic laws is essentially the same, only more complicated.
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and are indistinguishable relative to a partial description that pertains to that 
aspect. For convenience of exposition, all three cases share the same bottom 
left set, but differ in all other sets.
Let us now combine the partitions and the dynamics. In the first case, 
there is a nice harmony between the evolution of the system and the partition 
according to aspect: every (grey) set, to which the initial set evolves 
according to the dynamics, is completely contained within a set that shares 
an aspect of interest. Therefore the evolution of the system, when described 
in terms of these aspects, appears regular and even deterministic. In the 
second case, the partition is finer, into smaller sets, and at the level of the 
aspects the evolution appears to satisfy a probabilistic law. In the third case 
there is no harmony at all between the evolution and the partition, and in the 
long run we may not see any regularity at all in the evolution of the aspects. 
This case appears to be anomalous. The mental macrovariables could be 
of this kind. This is how even the anomaly of the mental can be given a 
reductive type-identity physicalist account. Alluding to Davidson, we might 
call this anomalous flat physicalism. Once again, which of the three cases 
best describes the mental regularities (or lack thereof) is a matter of fact, to 
be discovered scientifically.19
19 Of course, in saying this I reject the idea that the mental has to be anomalous since, 
for example, it is subject to norms such as rationality. But I do not expand on this 
here.
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The above account of the case of anomaly of the mental shows that in the 
type identity theory presented here, flat physicalism, there is an important 
sense in which the special sciences are autonomous. They are autonomous 
in that they discover, which are the aspects of the physical tokens that are 
significant and interesting and that exhibit regularity. Had we been Laplacean 
demons, had we known the complete microstate of the universe, we could 
derive the special sciences kinds and laws. But the complexity of the universe 
is such that this is not possible, and it is reasonable to guess that it will remain 
so, and so we can only access these significant aspects via their appearance 
in the special sciences. At the same time we must realize that at bottom these 
special sciences types are nothing but aspects of the fundamental physical 
structure of the world. The special sciences are, fundamentally, branches 
of physics. This is the only coherent physicalist approach: any attempt to 
salvage the autonomy of the special sciences by opting for non-reductivism 
is either a form of token dualism or simply incoherent.
6. Conclusion
Whether or not multiple realization holds in our universe, and in particular 
with respect to mental types, is a question of fact. But if there is genuine 
psycho-physical multiple realization, then there is genuine psycho-physical 
dualism: and this conclusion is analytical and not empirical. Many have 
hoped to escape this conclusion by way of the so-called non-reductive 
physicalism, but what I have shown here is that this is not an option.
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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